








Abstract		 This	dissertation	analyzes	Muslim	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	and	the	 intersection	 of	 these	 processes	with	 discourses	 of	 Pakistani	 nationalism	 and	 Islamic	feminism.		Drawing	primarily	on	interviews	and	participatory	observations	with	Pakistani	women	in	Karachi,	Islamabad,	and	Mississauga	associated	with	two	Sunni	Muslim	groups,	Al-Huda	 International	 and	 the	 Jamaat-e-Islami,	 I	 examine	 how	women	 comprehend	 and	inhabit	their	piety	in	and	through	the	spiritual,	social,	and	political	milieu	of	their	everyday	lives.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 taking	 up	 piety	 while	 understanding	 the	 spiritual	 as	 epistemological	reveals	contradictory	and	relational	dimensions	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivities,	including	complicities	 with	 structures	 of	 power	 and	 relationships	 with	 the	 secular.	 	 By	 taking	 up	religiosity	as	a	way	of	knowing,	this	dissertation	intervenes	in	the	normative	secularity	of	knowledge	production	about	Muslim	women	that	renders	the	epistemic	dimension	of	their	pious	subjectivities	unintelligible.			To	 explicate	 what	 analytical	 openings	 are	 enabled	 by	 taking	 up	 the	 spiritual	 as	epistemological,	 I	 look	 at	 how	 the	women	 I	 conducted	 research	with	 conceptualize	 their	piety	and	how	their	 Islamic	discourse	coalesces,	 contradicts	and	co-exists	with	dominant	discourses	of	Islam,	religio-nationalism,	and	universal	rights-based	feminism.		I	begin	with	an	exploration	of	the	spaces	created	for	Muslim	women	through	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	and	what	these	spaces	meant	to	the	women	I	met.		I	juxtapose	my	respondents’	Islamic	praxis	with	a	discourse	analysis	of	Pakistani	religio-nationalism	and	rights-based	Islamic	feminism	that	 also	 stake	 a	 claim	 on	 defining	 the	 relationship	 between	 women	 and	 Islam.	 	 These	discursive	structures	of	nationalism	and	feminism	anchor	analyses	of	Muslim	women’s	piety	in	secular	epistemologies	that	render	practices	such	as	veiling	or	the	qawwam	(authoritative	
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hadith.		The	process	of	completing	the	project	of	partition	is	thus	entangled	with	establishing	the	authority	of	the	Quran	and	hadith	as	a	guide	for	how	not	to	be	Hindu.	The	print	literature	circulated	by	and	amongst	Al-Huda	and	Jamaat	members	also	carries	references	that	indicate	the	persisting	place	of	partition	in	discourses	of	piety.		For	instance,	the	previously	mentioned	pamphlet	also	outlines	the	reasons	for	the	prevalence	of	biddat	in	Muslim	communities:	1. Blindly	following	the	ignorant	ways	of	one’s	ancestors	2. Exceeding	in	respect	of	elders	3. Imitating	the	rituals	of	imported,	non-Muslim,	especially	the	Hindu	culture	4. Disharmony	between	various	religious	groups	and	distortion	in	their	ideologies	5. Lack	of	knowledge	regarding	the	Sunnah	of	the	holy	prophet	(p.b.u.h)74	6. The	misunderstanding	that	innovation	is	just	a	matter	of	“difference	of	opinion”	(“Bidah,”	n.d.,	p.	5)		Echoing	the	generational	anxiety	in	the	reasons	for	biddat	implicit	in	Rabia’s	conviction	that	these	practices	will	take	time	to	go	away,	the	pamphlet	also	implicates	previous	generations	and	the	concomitant	dangers	of	“respect	for	elders”.		The	figuration	of	the	elders	as	repositories	of	fraught	nationalist	histories,	some	of	them	having	pre-dated	the	partition	of	India	and	the	independence	of	Pakistan,	constructs	an	embodied	teleology	of	time	and	space	in	the	development	of	piety.		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	especially	those	whose	parents	were	born	prior	to	1947,	cast	their	parents’	practice	of	Islam	in	these	terms	–	that	is,	as	not	adherent	to	the	text	and	infected	by	Hinduism.		In	this	sense,	piety	acquires	a	temporality	through	the	nationalist	framing	of	a	generation	gap.		Together,	their	Hindu	proclivities	and	their	status	as	elders	made	the	elders	a	formidable	obstacle	to	the	realization	of	an	authentic	Islamic	praxis.		Thus,	even	as	the	women	I	interviewed	disrupt																																																									74	P.b.u.h	is	an	acronym	for	“peace	be	upon	him”,	a	phrase	commonly	used	after	mentioning	the	Prophet.	
229	
the	gendered	relationships	tied	to	the	Pakistani	nation-state	as	discussed	in	chapter	four,	there	are	several	ways	in	which	their	religious	praxis	is	also	commensurate	with	nationalist	discourses	of	unity	and	othering.	For	example,	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	use	the	example	of	qawwam	to	discuss	how	the	religious	praxis	of	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	disrupts	dominant	nationalist	discourses.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	the	ways	in	which	qawwam	acquires	legitimacy	and	settles	into	place	as	an	integral	part	of	piety	through	multiple	and	interrelated	discursive	registers.		In	addition	to	being	contextualized	in	relation	to	the	
akhira	and	as	part	of	akhlaaq,	qawwam	is	distinguished	in	nationalistic	and	xenophobic	terms	from	women’s	experiences	of	oppression,	which	would	often	be	attributed	to	remnants	of	Hinduism.		As	Shumaila	put	it,	“It’s	not	that	men	and	women	aren’t	equal	in	Islam,	it’s	more	that	men	and	women	aren’t	equal	in	Pakistani	society.		I	feel	like	that	is	the	major	issue”.		Shumaila’s	assertion	here	is	indicative	of	an	underlying	critique	of	the	inability	of	the	Pakistani	nationalist	project	to	establish	an	Islamic	state	and	society	through	her	distinction	between	“Islam”	and	“Pakistani	society”.		For	her,	the	claim	that	Islam	was	not	egalitarian	was	because	of	the	mistaken	conflation	of	Islam	and	Pakistan.		Beenish,	a	teacher	and	volunteer	at	the	Jamaat,	was	more	explicit	in	her	critique	of	the	Pakistani	state	as	she	attributed	the	oppression	of	Pakistani	women	to	a	lack	of	implementation	of	Islamic	rights.		She	explained:		Women’s	rights	[in	Islam]	are	alhamdulillah	so	well	designed	that	any	problem	can	be	addressed	through	them	–	these	are	the	basic	teachings.	We	ourselves	don’t	implement	these	teachings	properly.	Implementation	is	the	issue	here	in	Pakistan.		We	know	that	this	is	an	Islamic	state	and	we	know	that	all	these	rights	are	given	to	women	but	because	there	is	no	implementation,	that’s	why	we	have	such	problems.		So,	I	think	that	if	these	things	were	implemented	properly,	then	this	propaganda	against	Islam	would	have	no	impact.		
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Beenish	locates	the	oppression	of	women	in	the	failure	to	implement	Islamic	rights	in	what	is	supposedly	an	Islamic	state.		In	addition	to	her	critique	of	the	Pakistani	state,	Beenish	argues	that	the	impression	that	Islam	is	oppressive	to	women	is	the	result	of	“propaganda”	against	Islam	and,	by	extension,	that	there	is	a	need	for	women	to	secure	themselves	against	such	misrepresentations	that	may	preempt	a	fuller	engagement	with	the	development	of	piety	for	fear	of	being	drawn	into	an	oppressive	situation.	In	fact,	this	is	something	very	actively	addressed	in	Al-Huda’s	discourse	of	piety	as	is	evident	in	one	of	Farhat	Hashmi’s	recorded	lectures	recommended	to	me	by	Rabia	where	she	spends	much	time	explaining	that	nowhere	in	Islam	is	a	man	considered	to	be	better,	superior,	more	valuable	or	preferred	by	Allah	over	a	woman	(Hashmi,	n.d.).		Speaking	categorically	against	practices	such	as	female	infanticide	and	the	perception	of	a	girl	child	being	a	burden,	Hashmi	explains	that	first	and	foremost	a	female	has	the	same	right	to	life	as	a	male	and	that	these	anti-female	practices	find	no	support	in	the	Quran	or	hadith.		Hashmi’s	series	of	lectures	on	the	topic	have	been	effective	in	assuaging	the	discomfort	of	her	audience	of	educated,	middle/upper	class	women	by	distinguishing	the	patriarchal	gender	relations	stemming	out	of	her	interpretation	of	qawwam	from	other	patriarchal	practices	that	would	be	characterized	as	ignorant	cultural	practices	of	the	illiterate	classes.	Using	the	example	of	the	hijab,	Kanwal,	a	student	of	a	weekly	home-based	Quran	class	taught	by	an	Al-Huda	graduate,	made	a	distinction	between	women	who	were	forced	to	wear	it,	and	those	who	chose	to	wear	it	through	the	development	of	their	religious	consciousness.		She	explained	the	difference	as	follows:		There	are	definitely	oppressed	women	like	when	you	go	to	Saudi	Arabia	you	can	see	that	–	the	way	some	men	treat	their	women…I	don’t	wear	the	hijab	but	there	are	two	kinds	of	people	who	wear	the	hijab.		One,	those	who	have	chosen	to	wear	the	
hijab	–	these	are	young	girls	like	your	age	or	a	bit	older	than	you	who	have	chosen	to	
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wear	hijab.…and	two,	those	who	have	been	made	to	wear	the	hijab	by	their	parents.			The	ones	who	have	chosen	to	wear	the	hijab,	they	are	the	ones	who,	in	my	opinion,	are	really	liberated	women.		Very	self-confident,	don’t	care	what	the	world	thinks,	want	to	make	a	statement	and	they	are	doing	it	only	for	one	reason,	to	please	Allah,	and	that’s	it.		These	women	are	really	self-confident.		Kanwal	deploys	the	stereotype	of	oppressed	Saudi	women	in	order	to	emphasize	the	agency	of	women	who	arrived	at	the	practice	of	wearing	the	hijab	through	“choice”.		Kanwal’s	notion	of	‘choice’	is	to	some	extent	symptomatic	of	the	ubiquity	of	liberal	ideals	of	the	autonomous	individual	who	is	free	from	coercion	and/or	the	oppressive	force	of	conformity.		The	‘liberated’	status	of	Kanwal’s	ideal	hijabi	is	thus	dually	linked	to	her	condition	of	freedom	and	her	ability	to	make	a	conscientious	choice.			However,	as	Saba	Mahmood	(2005)	cautions,	an	ethic	of	individual	choice	does	not	necessarily	reproduce	the	central	assumptions	of	liberalism.		For	Mahmood,	although	the	exercise	of	choice	carries	with	it	inflections	of	liberal	individualism,	it	does	not	necessarily	refer	to	the	valorization	of	individual	will	that	would	be	the	basis	of	choice	in	liberalism.		Instead,	she	argues,	the	notion	of	choice	must	be	read	within	the	field	of	possibilities	laid	out	as	part	of	a	discourse	of	piety.		That	is	to	say,	“choice	is	understood	not	to	be	an	expression	of	one’s	will	but	something	one	exercises	in	following	the	prescribed	path	to	becoming	a	better	Muslim”	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	85).		While	Mahmood’s	point	is	salient	in	terms	of	teasing	out	the	specificity	of	meaning	accorded	to	concepts	like	‘choice’	that	are	often	held	hostage	to	liberalism’s	claims	to	universalism,	I	emphasize	here	the	identity	produced	and	affirmed	through	the	deployment	of	such	terms	by	the	women	I	interviewed.		The	politics	of	representation	underpinning	Kanwal’s	portrayal	of	“liberated	women”,	for	example,	operate	through	a	process	of	othering	that	is	constitutive	of	their	piety	as	lived	experience.		In	other	words,	the	comfort	drawn	from	discursive	othering	of,	Saudi	women,	
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Hindus,	and	the	illiterate,	is	integral	to	how	women	submit	to	qawwam	while	maintaining	their	self-perception	as	conscientious,	educated	and	modern	women.		So,	while	‘choice’	may	not	follow	a	strictly	liberal	form	in	the	practices	of	piety	of	the	women	I	interviewed,	its	significatory	currency	is	drawn	from	its	association	with	liberal	modernity.		Several	women	I	met	echoed	such	perceptions	of	their	Islamic	praxis	and	expressed	frustration	with	misperceptions	of	the	status	of	women	in	their	notions	of	piety.		Ayesha,	a	student	at	an	Al-Huda	inspired	home-based	Quran	class	in	Mississauga,	pointed	out	that	there	is	a	willful	ignorance	about	the	aspects	of	Islam	that	relate	to	women.		She	stated:			Quran	gives	every	single	person	rights.		The	wife	has	these	rights,	the	husband	has	these	rights,	children	have	these	rights.	Inheritance	should	be	this	much	for	this	person	and	that	much	for	that	person.		In	Pakistan	if	women	only	knew	of	their	right	of	inheritance.		People	don’t	give	women	their	rightful	part	of	inheritance.		When	it	comes	to	that,	no	one	wants	to	know	what	Islam	says.		So,	for	Ayesha,	it	is	not	only	a	matter	of	the	Pakistani	state	and	society	ignoring	what	the	Quran	says,	but	also	that	they	especially	ignore	the	aspects	of	Islam	that	relate	to	women’s	rights	and	entitlements.		In	line	with	this	critique,	Ayesha,	like	Beenish	and	Shumaila,	contends	that	Islam	is	not,	strictly	speaking,	the	cause	of	experiences	of	gendered	oppression.		Instead,	like	many	of	the	women	I	met,	she	attributed	the	oppression	of	women	to	un-Islamic	practices	that	have	pervaded	gender	relations	amongst	Pakistanis.	These	un-Islamic	practices	are	typically	attributed	to	either	Saudi	Arabia,	the	West	or	to	Hinduism.		However,	it	is	interesting	to	note	how	the	women	I	interviewed	mobilized	each	of	these	foreign	influences	differently.		Explaining	the	reasons	for	women’s	experiences	of	oppression	in	Pakistan,	Ghazala	said:	The	reason	being	again,	if	you	don’t	mind,	is	that	we	have	lived	with	Hindus	for	900	years.		What	they	used	to	say	about	women	is	that	they	are	just	like	dust	on	our	shoes.		They	used	to	treat	women	as	though	she	has	no	right	to	her	life	–	she	is	only	associated	with	a	man.		She	has	no	identity	herself.		As	an	individual	she	is	nobody.	
233	
This	is	how	Hindus	think	about	women.		Mohammad	has	never	beaten	a	woman.		The	degree	to	which	Islam	protects	women,	the	degree	to	which	Islam	has	given	women	status	by	making	her	a	mother,	just	look	at	all	the	conveniences	Allah	has	provided	for	women	through	this.		Woman	herself	doesn’t	know.	Why?		They	of	course	weren’t	going	to	tell	her,	and	woman	herself	didn’t	try	to	find	out.		The	basic	problem	in	Pakistan	is	that	woman	herself	doesn’t	know	her	rights,	what	Islam	gives.		What	she	is	running	after	is	those	rights	that	the	West	is	talking	about.		See,	the	West,	they	never	gave	any	rights	to	women.		They	always	considered	women	as	a	body,	as	a	commodity,	as	a	thing	that	can	be	associated	with	selling.		Like	it’s	a	creature	that	is	sent	to	this	earth	to	be	humiliated	always	and	is	capable	of	nothing.		Whereas,	if	we	look	at	the	history	and	if	we	look	at	the	era	when	the	Prophet	was	ruling	and	if	we	look	at	Medina,	the	city	where	actually	Islam	was	being	practiced,	if	we	look	there,	woman	is	such	that	a	person	would	be	amazed.		For	Ghazala,	the	influence	of	Hindus	is	a	historic	circumstance	that	poses	the	threat	of	oppression	to	Pakistani	women,	however,	she	positions	the	West	as	the	means	through	which	many	women	mistakenly	think	they	will	find	respite	from	these	oppressive	Hindu	practices.		Thus,	she	instead	proposes	an	informed	practice	of	Islam,	where	women	would	know	their	Islamic	rights,	as	a	proven	course	for	women	to	fight	oppression	as	exemplified	in	Islamic	history.		In	other	words,	Ghazala	thinks	of	the	West	and	Islam	as	contesting	solutions	–	albeit	where	Islam	wins	out	–	to	the	problem	of	Hindu	oppression.		Sabeen	also	explained	how	women	are	navigating	the	legacy	of	Hinduism	in	Pakistan	in	the	fight	against	gendered	oppression:	I	think	all	over	the	world,	women	are	oppressed.		Yes,	they	are.		It	doesn’t	matter	where	they	are	living,	they	are	[oppressed]	to	one	degree	or	another	and	in	Pakistan	they	are	also	oppressed.		The	reason	is	that	we	are	not	following	the	Islamic	way	and	neither	are	we	following	any	Western	values.		We	are	just	in	limbo.		So	we	are	not	getting	any	kinds	of	rights.		We	are	not	getting	the	rights	that	a	Western	woman	has	and	we	don’t	have	the	Islamic	rights.		We	are	nowhere.		So	whatever	the	culture	is,	it	is	a	culture	borrowed	from	Hindus…whatever	we	were	left	with	after	so	many	years,	thousands	of	years,	and	so	we	have	that	cultural	baggage	that	I	was	talking	about.		It	(cultural	baggage)	is	that	men	can	dominate	women,	they	can	oppress	them,	they	can	force	them	to	stay	home.		They	can	do	anything	they	want,	they	can	kill	women	also…We	don’t	have	an	Islamic	system	so	out	with	that,	we	don’t	have	any	western	laws	and	rules	and	everything	so	out	with	that.		We	have	nothing	to	protect	ourselves.		That	is	my	perspective	of	how	the	world	is	basically	right	now.		
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Echoing	Ghazala’s	argument,	Sabeen	also	posited	the	West	as	a	competitor	to	Islam	in	terms	of	a	solution	and	located	Hinduism	as	the	root	of	the	problem	of	women’s	oppression.			Sabeen	and	Ghazala’s	characterizations	of	Western	and	Islamic	laws	as	mechanisms	through	which	women	can	gain	protection	(from	Hinduism)	rest	on	several	assumptions.		Their	understanding	of	the	oppression	of	women	was	mired	within	the	tensions	of	tradition	and	modernity	where	both	Islam	and	the	West	were	rendered	in	terms	of	modernity	and	Hinduism	in	terms	of	tradition.		The	ontological	claims	that	constituted	the	Manichean	logic	of	the	tradition-modernity	binary	are	evident	in	how	both	Sabeen	and	Ghazala	represented	Hinduism	in	Orientalist	terms.		By	homogenizing	Hinduism,	discursively	locating	it	in	the	past,	and	essentializing	it	as	inherently	oppressive	to	women	they	presented	themselves	as	belonging	to	modernity.		Thus,	underpinning	the	distinction	between	qawwam	and	oppression	was	a	nationalist	narrative	of	Islamic	modernity.		While	Al-Huda	women	in	particular	were	ostensibly	ambivalent	to	questions	of	the	nation-state	in	the	sense	that	they	reject	the	nation-state	as	a	defining	feature	of	their	social	imaginaries	(unlike	the	Jamaat),	the	persistent	invocation	of	the	Hindu-other	is	indicative	of	the	hegemony	of	Pakistan’s	existential	nationalist	mythologies	of	Hindu-Muslim	animosity.		In	addition,	this	form	of	othering	reaffirms	the	marginalization	of	Hindus	by	covering	over	the	historical	presence	of	Hindu	communities	in	Pakistan	and	classifying	them	as	foreign	in	the	interest	of	consolidating	Islam	as	the	basis	of	the	nation-state.		In	contrast	to	the	purportedly	Hindu-influenced	oppression	of	women	by	Pakistani	Muslims	who	do	not	know	any	better,	the	text-centric	approach	to	Islam	engendered	by	the	women	I	met,	then,	is	presented	as	an	alternative	pedagogy	and	method	of	practicing	Islam	that	has	a	powerful	
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claim	to	authenticity.		Developmentalist	dawah	opportunities	like	the	maasi	class,	for	instance,	are	thus	as	much	rendered	in	terms	of	saving	those	women	from	un-Islamic	practices	as	they	are	in	terms	of	saving	them	from	Hindu	oppression.		
Diasporic	Authenticity	The	discourses	of	piety	propagated	by	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	in	the	Pakistani	diaspora	in	the	West	have	been	instrumental	in	further	sharpening	this	notion	of	cultural	baggage	and	Hindu	influence.		Distance	over	time	and	space	presents	an	opportunity	to	expunge	and	renew	the	practice	of	Islam	for	diasporic	Pakistani	women	and	detach	from	Hindu/India.		An	illustrative	example	was	a	conversation	I	had	with	Razia,	a	woman	I	interviewed	in	Mississauga,	who	responded	to	my	upcoming	fieldwork	trip	to	Pakistan	by	saying:	“If	you	want	to	know	about	Islam	you	should	speak	to	women	here	(in	Mississauga)”.		Her	explanation	for	this	was	that	“In	Pakistan	we	are	living	in	the	past	because	we	are	too	close	to	the	past.		It	is	right	there	next	to	us	in	India	so	it	is	not	easy	to	let	it	go	and	move	on	to	Islam”.		Razia	collapses	the	temporal	and	spatial	here	into	a	teleological	narrative	of	progress	where	Islam	is	simultaneously	the	basis	and	the	not	yet	realized	telos	of	the	Pakistani	nation.		Central	to	her	(re)construction	of	the	Muslim	subject	is	a	reconfiguration	of	the	way	Islam	is	incorporated	into	Pakistani	national	identity,	which	unsettles	it	from	its	rigidified	place	as	an	existing	identity	upon	which	the	demand	for	Pakistan	was	made	and	relocates	it	temporally	and	spatially	by	imagining	it	as	a	notion	of	progress	that	is	intertwined	with	and	reinforced	through	experiences	and	narratives	of	migration.			
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In	other	words,	insofar	as	Islam	was	understood	as	the	ultimate	basis	for	the	Pakistani	nation	in	the	dominant	nationalist	narrative,	it	was	conceptualized	as	a	pre-existing	component	of	society	-	that	is,	Pakistan	is	supposed	to	be	an	expression	of	an	existing	Islamic	identity.		But	through	the	reconfiguration	of	the	temporality	of	Islam	in	the	discourse	of	the	nation,	the	women	I	met	trouble	this	conceptualization	of	the	nation.		This	temporal	imaginary	that	simultaneously	locates	Islam	as	the	past	(the	foundation)	and	the	future	(the	not	yet)	sets	in	motion	a	sense	of	national	duty	for	these	women	that	as	Pakistani	Muslims	there	is	a	need	to	actively	aspire	to	Islam.75		Furthermore,	the	simultaneous	location	of	India	as	a	geographic	neighbour	and	a	spectre	reflecting	the	past	(and	present)	of	Pakistan	produces	an	intimate	enemy,	an	ever-present	and	unrelenting	threat	holding	back	the	progress	of	the	nation	toward	Islam.		Thus,	proximity	is	a	problem	in	both	senses	–	as	similarity	and	space.			The	expedited	piety	of	the	diaspora	is	thus	enabled	through	the	mitigation	of	this	proximity	in	the	West	(read	as	Judeo-Christian).		In	a	booklet	recommended	to	me	by	another	member	of	Al-Huda	titled	Understanding	the	Evil	of	Innovation:	Bid’ah	(Ibn	Mohar	Ali,	2006),	Judeo-Christian	contexts	are	considered	relatively	safe	because	“their	falsehood	is	evident	and	less	likely	to	cause	us	to	stray”	whereas	in	the	case	of	those	who	are	submerged	in	cultures	rife	with	biddat	“it	is	more	difficult	to	shift	the	truth	from	falsehood”	
																																																								75	Naveeda	Khan	(2012)	characterizes	similar	processes	as	“striving”	–	a	notion	of	“Muslim	becoming”	that	is	inherent	in	the	national	imaginary	of	Pakistan.		She	points	to	the	poetry	of	one	of	the	so-called	founding	fathers	of	Pakistan,	Mohammad	Iqbal,	as	evidence	of	this	“tendency”	towards	becoming	rather	than	being	Muslim	at	the	inception	of	the	nation.		However,	I	hesitate	to	use	her	formulation	in	the	context	of	this	dissertation	because	she	seems	to	trace	an	alternative,	but	still	monolithic	and	undifferentiated	ideology	of	Pakistan,	which	is	precisely	what	I	am	attempting	to	unpack	through	the	spiritual	epistemologies	of	the	women	I	interviewed.		Moreover,	her	use	of	the	work	of	Mohammad	Iqbal	to	make	this	point	is	also	problematic	in	that,	at	best,	it	assumes	a	literate	national	populace	or,	at	worst,	reproduces	the	exclusion	of	the	illiterate	from	the	national	imaginary.	
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and	they	are	“more	prone	to	attract	us	to	vanity	and	that	which	is	pernicious”	(p.	57).		The	West	figured	prominently	but	contradictorily	in	my	respondents’	transnational	discourse	of	piety	ranging	from	a	knowable	Judeo-Christian	religious	space,	to	a	depraved	space	of	enlightenment-gone-awry,	but	always	a	less	threatening	space	because	it	is	relatively	culture-free,	and	therefore	biddat-free.		In	the	first	instance,	the	characterization	of	the	West	as	Judeo-Christian	situates	it	within	familiar	narratives	of	historic	encounters	between	Islam,	Christianity	and	Judaism	–	encounters	that	are	relayed	in	the	Quran	and	
sunnah	and	can	thus	be	identified	and	dealt	with	in	relatively	straightforward	ways	by	referring	to	textual	examples.		The	perceived	depravity	of	the	West	poses	a	different	set	of	issues	in	the	diaspora	especially	in	relation	to	parenting,	however,	this	depravity	is	seen	as	a	degeneration	of	Christianity	or	Judaism,	which,	interestingly,	is	less	threatening	than	degeneration	(through	innovation/biddat)	within	Islam	that	confuses	Islamic	identity	in	far	more	exhaustive	ways.		Thus,	the	West	signifies	an	easier	and	simpler	route	to	piety	for	many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	both	in	Pakistan	and	the	Pakistani	diaspora.			Through	a	migratory	spatial	displacement,	an	expedited	piety	is	able	to	emerge.		That	is,	the	diasporic	context	presents	an	opportunity	for	the	practice	and	development	of	piety	that	many	in	the	diaspora	felt	was	not	possible	within	Pakistan	because	of	its	proximity	to	India/Hinduism,	the	related	presence	of	biddat	and	shirk,	and	the	social	compulsion,	temptation,	and	desire	to	join	in	them.		At	the	same	time	women	in	the	diaspora	also	expressed	a	nostalgic	longing	for	Pakistan.		For	example,	another	woman	I	interviewed,	Ayesha,	referred	to	the	ease	with	which	one	can	fulfill	the	Islamic	duty	of	
namaaz	(prayer)	and	roza	(fast).		Referring	to	Pakistan,	she	said:		Everyday	you	can	hear	the	azaan	(call	for	prayers)	no	matter	where	you	are.		In	Ramzan,	all	the	restaurants	are	closed	during	fasting	hours,	there	are	no	ads	for	
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food,	and	people	who	are	not	fasting	don’t	eat	in	public,	so	you	see,	its	so	much	easier	to	fast	in	a	place	like	Pakistan	because	people	have	a	lot	of	respect	for	these	things.				Others	brought	up	examples	of	not	having	to	worry	about	whether	food	is	halal,	not	having	the	temptation	of	alcohol,	and	not	having	to	feel	awkward	in	more	Islamically	appropriate	attire	when	in	Pakistan.		Dominant	nationalist	narratives	of	the	creation	of	Pakistan	as	a	safe	place	for	Muslims	reverberate	through	these	expressions	of	nostalgia	and	memories	of	belonging.		This	affinity	for	Pakistan	is	strengthened	(if	not	produced)	through	diasporic	experiences	of	disorientation	and	alienation	in	the	West.		Noreen,	one	of	the	founding	members	of	an	Al-Huda	study	circle	in	Mississauga,	explained:		When	I	first	came	to	Canada	it	was	just	before	9/11	and	up	until	then	I	was	not	so	interested	in	learning	and	practicing	Islam	in	depth.		After	9/11	so	many	people	would	ask	me	about	Islam	and	why	something	like	this	is	allowed	in	Islam	and	I	didn’t	know	how	to	answer	this	question.		So	I	formed	this	group	in	order	to	answer	other	people’s	questions	-	but	now	I	am	here	because	I	have	my	own	questions.		However,	while	many	expressed	a	longing	for	this	context	they	simultaneously	put	these	very	feelings	into	question	by	drawing	attention	to	the	religious	complacency	produced	through	these	amenities.		Without	undermining	the	importance	of	a	“safe	place”	for	Muslims,	many	suggested	that	being	in	this	place	can	make	one	a	“lazy	Muslim”.		That	is,	many	women	in	the	diaspora	worried	that	Islam	is	taken	as	a	given	because	of	the	construction	and	dissemination	of	notions	of	Islam	as	part	of	national	identity	and	therefore,	development	of	Islamic	piety	in	Pakistan	has	stagnated.		Fariha	put	it	this	way:	“Pakistan	is	not	an	Islamic	state	but	it	is	an	Islam-friendly	state”.		So,	even	as	they	fondly	remember	the	sounds	of	the	azaan	in	every	corner,	Pakistan	still	occupies	a	contradictory	position	as	the	place	that	both	enables	and	obstructs	the	development	of	piety	for	these	women.	
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Developmentalist	Dawah	“Give	me	a	good	woman	and	I	will	give	you	a	good	nation.”	(Beenish)	
“Give	me	good	mothers	and	I’ll	give	you	good	societies.”	(Ghazala)	
“Good	nations	are	born	in	a	mother’s	lap.”	(Romana)	Coalescing	and	relational	discourses	of	the	nation	infuse	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	position	themselves	and	their	pious	subject	formation	in	relation	to	notions	of	progress.		In	several	interviews	I	conducted	there	was	a	recurring	reference	to	a	version	of	the	quotations	above,	signaling	how	these	women	perceived	their	position	and	role	in	society.		This	gendered	role	to	bear	and	rear	good	nations	was	not	only	limited	to	their	familial	relationships	but	was	also	extended	outside	the	home	through	the	Islamic	concept	of	dawah,	which	translates	to	a	call,	invitation,	appeal,	or	summons	(Mahmood,	2005,	p.	57).		The	practice	of	dawah	is	a	common	element	in	several	Islamic	groups.		For	some	groups,	however,	dawah	is	central	to	their	practices	of	piety.		Studies	of	Muslim	women’s	piety	groups	in	Bangladesh	and	Egypt,	for	example,	illustrate	a	preoccupation	with	dawah	similar	to	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat.		Samia	Huq	(2014)	argues	that	the	dawah	activities	she	observed	amongst	women	in	Bangladesh	“seek	to	transform	both	people’s	inner	spiritual	lives	as	well	as	the	public	space”	through	“conventional	preaching	to	friends	and	family,	and…going	into	the	public	space	in	a	more	thought-out	and	organized	manner”	(p.	81).		Mahmood	(2005)	similarly	observed	that,	in	the	case	of	the	Egyptian	women’s	
da’wa	movement,	a	range	of	activities	fell	under	the	practice	of	da’wa	including	“establishing	neighbourhood	mosques,	social	welfare	organizations,	Islamic	educational	
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institutions,	and	printing	presses,	as	well	as	urging	fellow	Muslims	toward	greater	responsibility,	either	through	preaching	or	personal	conversation”	(p.	58).		Many	of	the	women	I	interviewed	understood	dawah	as	a	way	of	“giving	back	to	the	community”	(Donya).		For	Donya,	dawah	was	a	“responsibility	as	a	Muslim	to	spread	good”	and	part	of	her	gendered	duty	to	create	a	strong	Islamic	society.		Farida	elaborated:		
Dawah	is	farz	(compulsory	responsibility).		Allah	has	said	that	even	if	you	have	learned	one	line	of	something,	one	ayat,	you	have	to	transfer	it	to	someone	else.		This	is	how	religion	will	continue…on	the	day	of	judgment	you	will	be	asked	that	you	had	this	knowledge,	what	did	you	do	with	it?		And	you	had	the	opportunity	and	the	resources…There	are	cars	standing	in	our	driveways.		We	are	going	all	over	the	place!		Farida’s	understanding	of	dawah	implicates	her	class	privilege	in	multiple	ways.		For	Farida,	it	is	even	more	egregious	that	those	with	resources	at	their	disposal	are	not	utilizing	them	towards	their	Islamic	duty.		The	cars	standing	in	her	driveway	represented	an	idle	resource	that	could	be	put	to	work	in	the	transfer	or	spread	of	Islamic	knowledge.		Farida’s	incredulity	evinces	her	perception	of	the	unfortunate	lost	potential	of	gaining	favour	for	the	afterlife	through	class	privilege.		The	implications	of	mobilizing	class	privilege	for	dawah	are	clearer	when	considered	in	relation	to	how	several	women	I	met	imagined	their	Islamic	praxis	in	terms	of	rationality.		As	Ghazala	mentioned,	another	reason	why	dawah	is	important	to	many	women	is	to	create	the	conditions	for	the	ongoing	maintenance	and	development	of	one’s	own	piety:	“If	you	want	to	be	a	pious	person,	you	have	to	make	others	just	like	you.		Otherwise,	it	is	very	easy	to	go	back	to	the	same	thing”.		Dawah,	in	the	religious	praxis	of	many	women	I	interviewed,	was	not	just	about	spreading	the	word	of	God	but	also	about	gaining	prospects	for	the	afterlife	and	homogenizing	practices	of	Islam	in	order	to	transform	the	public	space	and	reduce	the	possibility	of	different	practices	
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thwarting	the	development	their	own	rational	forms	of	piety.		Hence,	an	imperative	goal	in	the	practice	of	dawah	is	to	coax	others	to	become	like	the	rational	self.			
Dawah	takes	various	forms	in	the	practices	of	the	women	I	met	based	on	the	receivers	of	their	dawah.		In	particular,	I	noted	a	stark	difference	between	the	way	women	spoke	about	and	engaged	in	dawah	with	their	impious	counterparts	from	similar	social	locations	(upper	class,	literate,	urban,	English/Urdu	speaking)	and	those	from	othered	social	locations	(lower	class,	illiterate,	rural,	did	not	speak	English,	and/or	Urdu	was	not	their	first	language),	such	as	the	domestic	workers	in	the	maasi	class.		Dawah	activities	targeting	the	former	group	of	people	entailed	appeals	to	rationality	and	mobilizing	a	sense	of	similarity	through	commensurability	with	liberal	modernity	in	order	to	cast	their	version	of	piety	in	palatable	terms.		Contrastingly,	in	relation	to	the	latter,	their	dawah	took	the	form	of	developmentalist	activities	like	the	maasi	class	–	or	what	I	refer	to	as	‘developmentalist	dawah’.	I	often	found	myself	in	conversations	that	I	suspected	were	motivated	by	some	women’s	dawah	duties.		While	I	can	only	venture	a	guess	as	to	how	the	women	I	conducted	research	with	perceived	me,	I	imagine	that	they	located	me	higher	up	on	a	social	hierarchy	as	a	diasporic,	English-speaking,	educated,	middle-upper	class	Pakistani	woman.		This	was	particularly	evident	in	several	interactions	I	had	with	some	women	affiliated	with	Al-Huda.		I	began	noticing	this	perception	of	me	when	several	women	told	me	the	same	story	about	a	young,	‘modern’	girl	who	turned	her	life	around	through	Al-Huda.		The	stories	went	something	like	this:		One	day,	a	girl	showed	up	at	one	of	Dr.	Farhat	Hashmi’s	lectures	at	an	elite	hotel	venue	wearing	a	sleeveless	kameez	(long	shirt	that	is	typically	part	of	a	shalwar	
kameez	outfit).		Some	also	mentioned	that	she	was	wearing	capri	style	pants	and	no	
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dupatta	(long	scarf	typically	worn	with	shalwar	kameez	used	to	cover	the	chest	or	as	an	accessory).		Her	friend	had	brought	her	there.		The	girl	was	high	and/or	drunk	and/or	was	a	smoker.		She	stood	out	in	a	room	full	of	women	who	had	covered	their	heads	and	were	wearing	full	sleeves.		The	organizers	of	the	event	contemplated	turning	her	away	because	of	her	inappropriate	attire,	but	then	Farhat	Hashmi	asked	that	they	let	her	stay	and	that	they	not	say	or	do	anything	to	alienate	her.		The	girl	was	allowed	to	stay	and	listened	to	a	life-changing	lecture	that	made	her	break	down	and	cry.		After	the	lecture,	Farhat	Hashmi	asked	that	she	come	speak	with	her	in	private.		This	conversation	and	experience	made	this	girl	a	devout	and	active	member	of	the	Al-Huda.		She	“reverted”	to	Islam,	was	rehabilitated	from	her	vices,	started	covering	her	head,	and	stopped	wearing	sleeveless	clothes.	This	story,	with	its	references	to	the	elite	hotel	venue,	modern	styles	of	dress,	and	modern	vices,	was	meant	to	impress	people,	like	me,	who	were	read	as	“modern”.		Al-Huda’s	familiarity	with	things	that	are	otherwise	expected	to	be	absent	or	ostracized	within	stereotypical	understandings	of	conservative	Islamic	circles	is	a	way	of	signaling	their	difference	and	their	modernity.		Many	of	the	upper	class	women	I	interviewed	had	come	to	Al-Huda	through	a	lecture	or	a	daura-e-quran	held	at	one	of	the	elite	country	clubs	or	hotels,	such	as	the	Sheraton,	in	Karachi	or	Islamabad.		Donya	explained	how	the	elite	venues	were	used	as	“a	pull,	a	magnet”	and	students	were	drawn	to	these	venues	because	they	were	“curious	as	to	how	Islam	is	taught	at	the	Sheraton”.		The	success	of	Al-Huda	thus	lies	in	part	in	their	deliberate	efforts	to	create	classed	spaces	that	would	appeal	to	these	women.		As	Donya	explained,	several	smaller	organizations	inspired	by	Al-Huda	have	been	emerging	offering	“spiritual	spas”	and	retreats.		She	explained	their	emergence	as	follows:	You	have	these	things	where	they	take	you	to	the	country	club	for	five	days	for	[Islamic]	studies.		All	[these	kinds	of	things]	are	there.	That	is	the	need	of	the	
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day…urban	elite	women	are	rich	and	the	husbands	are	earning	and	basically	they	are	in	kitty	parties.				For	Donya,	Al-Huda,	and	other	similar	organizations,	are	able	to	appeal	to	elite	women	and	provide	an	alternative	to	how	they	spend	their	time.		Their	inclusivity	of	the	“sleeveless”	girl	is	not	only	evidence	of	their	ability	to	relate	to	the	modern	woman,	but	also	an	endorsement	of	their	Islamic	praxis	by	a	member	of	the	upper	classes.		That	this	“sleeveless”	girl	found	Al-Huda	to	be	a	relatable	and	credible	space	affirmed	Al-Huda	as	a	modern	and	progressive	phenomenon.			Along	similar	lines,	references	to	“white	converts”	who	are	members	of	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat	played	a	major	role	in	establishing	the	legitimacy	of	their	religious	praxis	as	modern.		Many	women	would	say	that	white	converts	are	often	the	“best	Muslims”	or	that	they	are	“even	stronger	Muslims”	than	those	who	are	born	Muslim.		Like	the	perceived	absence	of	biddat	in	the	West	discussed	earlier,	the	valorization	of	white	converts	is	constructed	upon	underlying	assumptions	about	the	objective	cultural	neutrality	of	whiteness.		White	converts	are	not	only	valorized	because	they	embraced	Islam	despite	their	whiteness,	but	they	are	valorized	because	they	embraced	Islam	through	their	whiteness.		That	is,	whiteness	denotes	an	elevated	form	of	rational	engagement	with	Islam	that	is	free	of	the	“cultural	baggage”	that	Muslims	of	colour	have	to	contend	with.		The	very	presence	of	white	converts	in	their	membership	is	operationalized	as	a	means	to	objectively	establish	the	legitimacy	of	their	religious	praxis.		Together,	references	to	the	“sleeveless”	girl,	elite	hotels	and	“white	converts”	indicate	the	terms	upon	which	dawah	is	directed	at	the	“modern”	upper	classes.		Through	the	lure	of	familiarity	and	similarity,	many	women	I	interviewed	attempted	to	engage	in	dawah	with	those	they	viewed	as	their	peers	in	social	status.	
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Dawah	taking	place	within	these	relationships	is	markedly	different	from	how	
dawah	takes	place	with	those	considered	to	be	outside	the	reach	of	familiarity	or	the	realm	of	similarity.		This	disparity	was	made	further	evident	to	me	by	the	experience	of	being	privy	to	general	discussions	about	the	problems	in	the	practice	of	Islam	amongst	the	“illiterate”	lower	classes,	despite	perceptions	of	me	as	an	impious	Muslim	of	sorts.		I	was	reminded	of	Chandra	Mohanty’s	(2003)	critique	of	Western	feminism	where	she	draws	on	Trinh	Minh	Ha’s	critique	of	Western	philosophy:	“the	‘conversation	of	man	with	man’	is…mainly	a	conversation	of	‘us’	with	‘us’	about	‘them’,	of	the	white	man	with	the	white	man	about	the	primitive-native	man”	(p.	75).		Being	invited	into	the	“us”	to	have	a	conversation	about	“them”	indicated	to	me	the	perception	of	a	shared	privilege	and	status	between	me	and	the	women	I	was	having	these	conversations	with.		Although	this	shared	status	did	not	preclude	me	from	being	subjected	to	dawah	activities,	it	did	shape	these	encounters	through	a	perception	of	a	shared	outside	–	or	a	shared	‘them’.	The	complex	processes	of	othering	in	the	discursive	matrix	that	underpins	my	respondents’	practices	of	dawah	illustrates	the	ways	in	which	literalist	approaches	to	piety	can	be	entangled	with	liberal	hierarchical	dichotomies.		The	developmentalist	approach	taken	in	practices	of	dawah	aimed	at	women	and	girls	from	villages,	the	“illiterate”,	and	“the	poor”,	as	exemplified	by	the	maasi	class	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	emerge	out	of	this	perception	of	‘us’	and	‘them’.		Furthermore,	this	approach	is	formulated	at	the	intersection	of	their	text-centricism	and	the	rejection	of	custom/tradition	and	is	couched	in	the	language	of	benevolence,	progress,	and	rationality.		Thus,	these	interactions	are	occurring	on	drastically	different	terms	than	the	dawah	activities	targeted	to	the	upper	classes.		My	respondents’	text-centric	understanding	of	Islam	represents	one	of	many	ways	
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of	engaging	with	Islam	amongst	Pakistanis,	yet	it	structures	a	hierarchy	of	Muslimness	where	the	literate	are	at	the	top	and	the	illiterate	are	at	the	bottom	with	a	gradient	of	permutations	in	between.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	women	I	met	consider	all	literate	Muslims	better	than	illiterate	ones,	however,	the	potentiality	of	becoming	a	good	Muslim	is	heightened	for	the	literate	since	direct,	individual	readings	of	holy	texts	is	foundational	to	their	notion	of	piety.		As	a	result,	they	construct	a	hierarchy	that	marginalizes	and	demonizes	many	popular	Islamic	practices	where	direct	access	to	Quranic	text	is	immaterial.				
Mullahs	and	Alim/as	The	demonization	of	popular	practices	is	exemplified	in	the	way	some	women	constructed	and	deployed	the	trope	of	the	mullah	and	contrast	it	to	the	alim/a	(alim	for	male,	alima	for	female).		Notably,	these	women	were	responding	to	accusations	hurled	at	them	for	being	“fundamentalists”	because	of	their	literalist	orthodox	take	on	Islam	as	mentioned	in	chapter	four.		As	such,	they	were	also	defending	themselves	against	these	accusations	by	redirecting	it	to	others.		Moreover,	at	least	one	woman	I	interviewed,	Donya,	made	the	effort	to	unpack	the	vilification	of	the	mullah.		When	I	discussed	this	issue	with	Donya	she	had	a	careful	and	nuanced	position	that	was	attuned	to	how	the	figure	of	the	
mullah	is	mobilized	in	the	upper	“liberal”	classes	to	homogenize	and	denounce	religiosity.		Nevertheless,	most	other	women	I	interviewed	participated	in	the	dissemination	of	this	trope.		Even	in	the	context	of	defending	their	own	practice	of	Islam,	they	relied	on	affirming	existing	stereotypes	of	the	mullah	to	establish	themselves	as	different.		Many	of	the	women	I	met	often	traced	the	prevalence	of	erroneous	ways	of	engaging	with	the	Quran	to	the	
246	
pervasive	influence	of	“mullahs”	–	note	that	the	plural	form	of	mullah	is	anglicized	by	adding	an	‘s’,	which	is	indicative	of	the	semantic	origins	and	the	circles	in	which	these	tropes	circulate.		The	category	of	the	mullah	is	evasive	because	of	its	vastness	in	the	sense	that	it	can	include	anyone	(male)	who	publicly	acts	as	an	authority	on	Islam.		However,	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	it	has	an	inescapable	connotation	of	irrationality	and	ignorance	–	a	connotation	that	emerged	during	the	colonial	era	and	became	particularly	damning	during	and	after	the	Zia-ul-Haq	regime	(Khan,	2012).		The	mullah	is	thus	constructed	as	a	despised	and	illegitimate	figure	because	of	the	popularity	of	his	authority	despite	his	dubious	knowledge	of	the	Quran.		Compounding	this	portrayal	of	the	mullah,	many	women	I	interviewed	also	described	mullahs	as	inherently	“scary”	and	“unapproachable”	because	they	are	“intolerant”,	“extremist”,	and	“backward”,	among	other	things.		Such	sensational	and	homogenized	representations	of	the	monstrous	
mullah	carry	much	currency	within	the	social	imaginaries	of	the	educated	classes	in	Pakistan	and	the	Pakistani	diaspora	where	the	mullah	becomes	a	figurative	punching	bag	who	can	be	blamed	for	almost	any	social	problem	arising	in	Pakistan	from	child-molestation	to	terrorism.		Underpinning	this	representation	of	the	mullah	is	a	mistrust	and	disdain	for	the	masses	that	are	in	turn	depicted	as	ignorant,	lacking	autonomy,	and,	therefore	vulnerable	to	the	mullah’s	dominance.		In	contrast,	the	alim/a	is	represented	as	a	learned	scholar,	with	a	worldly	outlook	and	a	studied	and	knowledgeable	approach	to	Islam.		To	circumvent	the	damaging	influence	of	mullahs,	the	women	I	interviewed	emphasized	the	role	of	the	alim/a	in	the	development	of	piety.		Ghazala,	a	regular	participant	of	a	home-based	Jamaat	Quran	class,	put	it	this	way:	
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This	character	of	the	mullah,	in	Islam	he	has	no	place.		Mullahs	have	no	place	in	Islam.		But	there	is	a	place	for	alims.		Alims	have	a	place	in	Islam.		Alims	know	about	everything	happening	in	the	world.		If	you	ask	an	alim	to	relate	something	to	the	Quran,	he	will	be	able	to	comprehend	and	relate	and	implement	it.		He	will	be	able	to	tell	people	how	to	relate	it	to	their	lives.		Implicit	in	Ghazala’s	statement	is	the	incommensurability	between	the	mullah	and	modernity	in	the	sense	that	the	mullah	is	not	even	able	to	comprehend	modern	day	problems,	let	alone	advise	on	them.		This	is	not	only	a	failure	on	the	part	of	the	mullah	to	embrace	modernity	but	it	is	also	symptomatic	of	his	inability	to	master	Quranic	text	and	manipulate	it	with	confidence	to	apply	it	to	modern	day	life.		The	alim/a,	by	contrast,	masterfully	engages	Quranic	texts	and	brings	it	into	conversation	with	modern	worldly	matters.			A	common	narrative	of	this	contrast	that	came	up	in	several	interviews	and	conversations	was	of	how	a	mullah	would	address	the	struggles	of	a	working	woman.		In	this	narrative,	the	mullah,	being	inextricably	fixed	in	his	“backward”	outlook	on	society,	would	impulsively	forbid	women	from	working	altogether,	while	an	alim/a	would	carefully	examine	the	particularities	of	a	woman’s	struggle	and	draw	on	his/her	expertise	of	holy	texts	to	give	advice	on	how	a	good	Muslim	woman	would	manage	her	circumstances.		This	narrative	pivots	on	the	construction	of	the	mullah-extremist	as	the	‘other’	who	is	constitutive	of	self-presentations	of	the	women	I	met.		For	instance,	Farida,	a	teacher	and	student	at	an	Al-Huda	centre,	gave	the	following	example	of	how	learning	from	Al-Huda	is	different	from	learning	from	a	mullah:	Al-Huda	doesn’t	have	an	extremist	view	about	things.		They	believe	that	you	don’t	have	to	leave	worldly	things	because	it	is	the	world	that	we	have	to	live	in.		When	we	watch	mullahs	we	see	what	their	views	are	and	they	say	things	like	[women]	should	stay	at	home	etcetera.		Al-Huda	is	different	because	they	say	that	[women]	can	go	out	also,	and	you	can	work	also	if	the	circumstances	are	good	for	women	and	the	environment	is	okay.	
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	Distancing	the	self	from	the	mullah-extremist-other	affirms	Al-Huda’s	place	in	modernity	in	that	it	shows	the	congruency	of	Al-Huda’s	literalist	approach	to	the	Quran	with	the	preferred	subject	position	of	a	modern	worldly	Muslim.		As	mentioned,	Al-Huda	further	demonstrates	its	investments	in	portraying	a	cosmopolitan	and	global	outlook	in	the	deliberate	choice	of	adding	the	suffix	“International”	in	naming	the	organization	“Al-Huda	International”.		Likening	the	self	with	the	alim/a,	further	consolidates	this	position	by	cashing	in	on	the	value	placed	on	the	learned,	scholarly,	cosmopolitan	subject	of	modernity	and	taking	advantage	of	the	legitimacy	this	affords.		Accordingly,	the	alim/a	emerges	as	the	agent	of	progress	in	the	discourse	of	the	women	I	interviewed.	At	the	same	time,	the	collapse	of	the	category	of	the	mullah	with	extremists	further	demonizes	mullahs	and	their	followers	by	associating	them	with	an	irrational	and	depoliticized	form	of	violence	–	an	association	with	exacerbated	implications	in	the	context	of	the	hegemony	of	War	on	Terror	discourse.		As	Sunera	Thobani	(2010)	points	out,	in	the	logic	of	the	War	on	Terror	the	enemy	other	is	constructed	as	an	“existential	enemy”	and	not	a	“political”	one	(p.	141).		This	discursive	depoliticization	of	the	other	renders	the	enemy	as	a	“mythic,	abstract	figure”	(p.	141)	and	excludes	any	possibility	of	the	existence	of	political	contexts	–	contexts	that	may	implicate	the	self	in	disturbing	ways	that	challenge	claims	of	innocence	and	benevolence.		The	existential	dimension	of	portrayals	of	mullahs,	as	exemplified	in	Ghazala’s	comments	about	mullahs	having	no	place	in	Islam,	is	particularly	haunting	in	the	context	of	this	discourse	and	the	corresponding	drone	warfare	in	northern	Pakistan	that	elicits	tacit	and	overt	support	from	influential	pockets	of	urban	middle	and	upper	class	Pakistanis.			
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It	is	important	to	note	that	in	the	context	of	Pakistan,	liberal	logics	of	tradition,	education,	and	progress	operate	on	multiple,	interrelated	levels	and	the	discourses	of	the	women	I	met	are	situated	within	these	fraught	contexts.		First,	as	a	country	that	is	repeatedly	and	persistently	cast	in	the	imperialist	idiom	of	the	War	on	Terror	and	the	“failed	state	doctrine”	(Tahir,	2009),	Pakistan	figures	prominently	in	global	discourses	of	tradition	and	progress.		Accordingly,	Pakistan	is	vulnerable	to	imperialist	interventions	as	exemplified	by	the	contemporary	drone	warfare	inflicted	by	the	United	States	as	part	of	the	War	on	Terror.		Second,	within	Pakistan,	the	spectre	of	terrorism	and	the	collapsing	of	entire	communities	(Waziristani,	Pashtun,	Baloch,	Afghan	refugees)	into	the	category	of	the	terrorist	contributed	to	a	polarization	of	Muslim	identities	as	a	result	of	many	Pakistanis	attempting	to	consolidate	and	demarcate	this	category	further	in	order	to	distance	themselves	from	terrorism.		This	polarization	pits	the	literate	modern	Muslim	as	the	driver	of	progress	against	the	illiterate	anti-modern	(non)	Muslim	as	a	regressive	and	potentially	violent	force	in	Pakistan.		The	overlapping	discourses	of	terrorism	and	progress	and	the	consequent	mapping	of	good	and	bad	Muslims	propels	and	expands	liberal	hierarchies	and	forms	of	exclusion	and	marginalization	through	a	literalist	Islam.		
Liberal	and	Literalist	Islam	As	the	above	discussion	illustrates,	my	respondents’	self-proclaimed	literalist	engagements	with	the	text	implicate	their	processes	of	religious	subject	formation	in	socio-economic	hierarchies	and	discourses	of	othering.		In	this	section,	I	examine	how	conventional	ways	of	understanding	the	politics	of	Islamic	groups	like	Al-Huda	and	the	Jamaat,	who	take	a	literalist	approach	to	Islam,	make	invisible	the	commensurability	and	
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complicity	between	literalism	and	liberalism.		I	argue	that	taking	into	consideration	how	liberal	values	are	mobilized	through	the	privileging	of	the	literate	subject	brings	literalist	groups	into	conversation	with	liberalism	in	significant	ways.		This	requires	a	shift	in	focus	from	how	the	text	operates	in	definitions	of	liberal	Islam	where	the	practice	of	progressive/modernist	ijtihad	is	privileged	as	the	mechanism	through	which	Islam	is	reconciled	with	liberal	values.		In	other	words,	to	explicate	the	liberal	politics	of	literalist	groups	I	move	beyond	an	analysis	of	the	explicit	production/commensuration	of	liberal	values	with	and	through	the	Quran	to	an	analysis	of	the	implications	of	subject	formation	through	text-centricism.			This	discussion	shifts	the	focus	from	theorizations	of	the	relationship	between	Islam	and	liberalism	where	the	potential	for	commensurability	is	primarily	identified	in	terms	of	interpretive	practices	that	move	away	from	literalism	and	proceed	through	ijtihad	(Jackson,	2011;	Kurzman,	1998;	Ramadan,	2009).		As	mentioned	in	the	discussion	on	Islamic	feminism	in	chapter	three,	ijtihad	refers	to	the	systematic,	progressive,	and	contextualized	reinterpretation	of	holy	texts.		The	potential	for	commensurability	between	liberal	values	and	Islam	is	typically	situated	in	this	practice	because	it	represents	the	possibility	for	reconciliation	by	taking	up	Islamic	scriptures	as	flexible	texts	that	are	open	to	interpretation.		This	approach	to	Islam	is	akin	to	the	Islamic	modernism	of	Mohammad	Iqbal,	Sayyid	Ahmad	Khan	and	the	Aligarh	Movement,	or	what	some	have	termed	“liberal	Islam”	(Jackson,	2011;	Kurzman,	1998)	or	“secular	theology”	(Mahmood,	2006,	p.	335).		The	contours	of	this	conceptualization	of	liberal	Islam	are	further	sharpened	by	its	opposition	to	“traditionalist	Islam”,	which	is	defined	as	committed	to	upholding	historic	“Islamic	tradition”,	and	is	thereby	considered	to	be	in	opposition	to	liberal	notions	of	
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progress,	and	engaged	in	a	more	literal	interpretation	of	scripture	(Jackson,	2011;	Ramadan,	2011).		Maulana	Maududi	and	the	Jamaat-e-Islami	are	often	given	as	examples	of	this	approach.		The	women	I	conducted	research	with	would	be	considered	“traditionalists”	if	we	were	to	adhere	to	this	schematic.			The	defining	moment	in	this	dichotomous	mapping	of	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	is	the	rejection	of	“Islamic	tradition”	as	anti-modern	and	a	subsequent	engagement	in	progressive	interpretative	practices	that	reconcile	Islam	with	modernity	(imagined	as	a	universal	and	singular	phenomenon).		Accordingly,	one	of	the	reasons	why	literalist	traditions	tend	to	be	left	out	of	definitions	of	‘liberal	Islam’	is	because	of	their	alleged	allegiance	to	upholding	‘Islamic	tradition’,	where	Islamic	tradition	is	narrowly	defined	as	the	strict	adherence	to	replicating	the	historic	Islam	of	the	time	of	the	Prophet	(Jackson,	2011;	Kamrava,	2011;	Ramadan,	2009).		The	perceived	inability	and	unwillingness	of	literalist	traditions	to	contextualize	Islam	in	relation	to	modernity	because	of	their	resistance	to	questioning	and	rejecting	‘tradition’	is	taken	to	be	evidence	of	incommensurability	with	liberal	values.		I	argue	that	the	rejection	of	tradition,	as	is	suggested	in	such	definitions	of	liberal	Islam,	is	not	sufficient	in	and	of	itself	as	a	liberal	value.		Rather,	the	rejection	of	tradition	must	be	accompanied	by	a	commitment	to	progress,	driven	by	individual	liberty,	reason	and	rationality	in	order	to	be	considered	liberal.		In	failing	to	account	for	the	way	the	notion	of	“tradition”	operates	as	a	function	of	progress,	the	distinction	between	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	ignores	the	centrality	of	the	dynamic	produced	by	this	duality	in	liberal	political	formations.		This,	in	turn,	elides	an	understanding	of	the	significant	ways	in	which	liberalism	and	literalism	are	entangled.	
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To	briefly	elaborate	on	the	dynamic	of	tradition	and	progress	in	liberalism,	I	turn	to	critical	interventions	and	critiques	in	theories	of	liberalism	that	explicate	its	complicity	with	imperialism.		Uday	Mehta	(1999)	suggests	that	in	liberal	theory	customs	and	traditions	are	considered	antithetical	to	progress	because	they	“render	reason	unnecessary”	(Mill,	2009,	p.	7)	both	in	their	practice	and	inception.		The	exercise	of	mental	faculties	is	preempted	for	individuals	who	conform	to	customs	because	conformity	or	“imitation”	does	not	require	the	exercise	of	mental	faculties.		For	the	prominent	liberal	theorist	John	S.	Mill	(2009),	for	instance,	customs	predominantly	represent	a	lack	of	individual	choice	and	hence	are	inimical	to	progress	and	those	who	live	their	lives	conforming	to	customs	imbibe	an	“ape-like…imitation”	(p.	71),	which	effectively	reduces	individuals	to	automatons.		Moreover,	not	only	does	following	customs	not	strengthen	the	mental	faculties	and	contribute	to	progress,	it	actually	weakens	them	according	to	Mill	(2009).		Customs,	then,	are	to	be	rejected	as	a	regressive	force	in	society.		Societies	where	the	“despotism	of	custom	is	complete”	(p.	86)	are	categorized	as	“barbaric	societies”	(p.	88)	in	Mill’s	(2009)	theorization,	which	are	then	as	a	whole	equivalent	to	children	and	are	thus	not	extended	individual	liberty	until	they	are	appropriately	civilized.		Uday	Mehta	(1999)	has	shown	how	“maturity	of	mental	faculties”	(Mill,	2009,	p.	12)	as	a	pre-requisite	for	the	extension	of	individual	liberty	justifies	the	exclusion	of	entire	societies	by	infantilizing	them	and	mobilizes	colonialism	by	positioning	the	West	in	paternalistic	and	benevolent	terms	with	the	responsibility	to	bring	these	infantilized	societies	into	modernity	(Mehta,	1999).		Liberalism	thus	inevitably	inaugurates	a	civilizing	mission	that	in	Mill’s	day	took	the	form	of	British	imperial	expansion	and	colonialism,	but	now	can	be	seen	and	felt	in	more	multifarious,	hybrid	and	dispersed	forms	through,	for	example,	imperialist	wars	and	
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development	projects.		It	is	this	relationship	between	tradition/custom	and	progress	that	mobilizes	a	whole	set	of	imperialist	imperatives	within	liberal	discourses	and	is	what	gives	meaning	to	the	rejection	of	tradition	in	liberal	theory.			Moreover,	in	a	postcolonial	context	defined	by	the	project	of	nation-building,	liberal	secularism	holds	discursive	power	as	being	the	only	vehicle	through	which	both	gender	equality	and	religious	pluralism	can	be	guaranteed	through	its	privileging	of	the	autonomous	individual	(Needham	&	Rajan,	2007).		That	is,	recourse	to	the	central	tenets	of	liberal	political	philosophy	of	freedom	and	inclusion	based	on	an	ontological	conception	of	individual	autonomy	brings	questions	of	difference	into	momentary	(and	illusory)	relief	through	a	focus	on	institutionalizing	individual	rights.		Critics	of	liberalism	argue	that	this	focus	on	the	individual	demarcates	inclusion,	democratic	franchise,	and	freedoms	based	on	a	foundational	exclusion	that	emerges	out	of	the	pre-requisite	of	individual	possession	of	autonomous	rationality	(Mehta,	1999;	Mohanram,	1999;	Spivak,	1999).		That	is	to	say,	the	individual	subject	of	liberalism	must	be	in	possession	of	rationality	in	order	to	receive	individual	liberal	rights	and	freedoms.		For	Radhika	Mohanram	(1999),	the	individuality	of	the	liberal	subject	is	inextricably	tied	to	the	separation	of	the	mind	and	the	body.		In	her	exploration	of	articulations	of	the	liberal	body	Mohanram	argues	that	the	hierarchical	distinction	made	between	the	static	body	and	the	progressive	consciousness	enables	and	depends	upon	the	visibility	and	representation	of	marked,	othered	bodies.		While	the	liberal	body	is	achieved	through	a	hierarchical	separation	between	the	mind	and	body,	the	othered	body	is	only	ever	perceived	or	represented.		This	is	because	this	perception	is	constituted	through	the	process	of	“the	body	as	materiality	with	its	own	logic	and	agency	[getting]	left	behind	
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within	static	space,	a	punctuation	mark	in	the	maturation	and	socialization	process	of	the	[liberal]	subject”	(Mohanram,	1999,	p.	25).		The	material	body	is	thus	expunged	from	the	ideal	liberal	body	and	then	brought	back	in	through	representation	in	the	form	of	the	hypervisible,	different,	and	inferior	Other.		For	Mohanram,	the	way	the	othered	body	figures	is	always	tied	to	an	external	referent,	that	is,	the	ideal	liberal	body	–	or	in	the	case	of	the	women	I	met,	the	rational	pious	body.		The	domestic	workers	in	the	maasi	class,	then,	constitute	this	hypervisible	body	as	can	be	seen	in	how	the	scope	of	their	affect	was	reduced	to	a	bodily	response	that	has	not	yet	developed	to	maturation	through	the	enactments	of	the	rational	mind.		Moreover,	recall	how	my	respondents’	had	to	contend	with	their	embodied	practices	of	veiling	being	conflated	with	how	a	maasi	or	women	from	the	lower	classes	would	cover	themselves.		For	some	women	I	met,	this	conflation	was	offensive	because	they	felt	that	their	practices	of	veiling	were	different	from	the	maasi	and	lower	class	women	because	their	practice	came	out	of	a	rational	engagement	with	Islam	and	not	the	bodily	needs	of	a	worker	in	transit.		This	was	also	clear	in	the	way	these	embodiments	manifested	physically	–	the	distinction	between	what	the	forms	of	covering	looked	liked	signaled	the	level	of	rationality	associated	with	the	practice.		The	hierarchical	relationship	between	the	mind	and	the	body	articulated	through	the	separation	of	the	mind	and	the	body	is	thus	a	significant	and	formative	component	of	my	respondents’	Islamic	discourse.	Attending	to	these	features	of	liberalism	makes	visible	the	implications,	expanse	and	shifting	contours	of	‘liberal	Islam’	in	Pakistan.		The	earlier	discussion	about	my	respondents’	discourses	and	practices	of	othering	unpacks	and	decentres	the	conventional	association	between	liberalism	and	ijtihad	–	and	the	related	liberal	fetishization	of	
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“moderate”	Muslims	–	in	order	to	enable	a	thicker	description	and	critique	of	liberalism	by	opening	up	an	epistemological	space	for	considering	“literalist”	or	“traditionalist”	Muslim	groups	as	sites	that	are	complicit	in	processes	of	subject	formation	that	are	complicit	with	liberal	social	hierarchies.		The	commensurability	of	literalism	and	liberalism	is	evident	in	the	processes	of	othering	complicit	in	my	respondents’	modes	of	subject	formation	and	the	social	relations	that	are	constitutive	of	and	constituted	by	their	practices	of	piety.		I	use	the	language	of	commensurability	and	co-production	here	so	as	not	to	suggest	that	these	Islamic	formations	are	a	linear	derivation	from	liberalism,	and	at	the	same	time	to	move	away	from	a	futile	conversation	on	their	degree	of	authenticity	and	distinctness.		Thus,	as	an	analytical	framing,	co-production	does	not	presume	a	priori	distinctness	and	foregrounds	relationality	and	fluidity	(Mongia	2007).		As	such,	my	respondents’	complicity	in	social	relations	of	power	is	made	evident	through	the	authorizing	discourses	they	mobilized	to	establish	their	positionality	as	rational	subjects	of	Islam.		In	particular,	overlapping	authorizing	discourses	of	rationality/progress,	text-centricism,	and	developmentalism	illustrate	how	these	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	are	complicit	in	reifying	liberal	trajectories	of	progress.		The	distinction	between	liberal	and	traditionalist	Islam	cannot	be	made	based	on	the	content	of	their	interpretations	of	holy	texts,	rather,	liberalism	is	more	fruitfully	gauged	by	the	mechanics	of	how	holy	texts	are	engaged	and	the	subject-positions	these	mechanisms	produce.		
Conclusion	While	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	women’s	call	to	rationality	has	given	way	to	productive	possibilities	in	terms	of	dismantling	the	Pakistani	state’s	discourses	of	Islam	
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and	disrupting	and	reconfiguring	patriarchal	relationships	in	their	homes	and	communities	(see	chapters	three	and	four),	it	has	clearly	also	been	constituted	by	and	is	constitutive	of	hierarchical	relations	of	power.		The	centrality	of	the	text	in	my	respondents’	literalist	Islam	mobilizes	a	discourse	of	rationality	that	privileges	the	literate	student-subject	as	the	ultimate	model	for	modern	pious	subject	formation.		By	foregrounding	the	text	and	literacy	in	the	development	of	piety,	the	women	I	met	construct	an	elite	and	exclusive	practice	of	Islam	that	marginalizes	the	‘illiterate’	and	dismisses	practices	of	Islam	that	do	not	centralize	the	text.		As	mentioned,	these	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	are	also	co-imbricated	in	processes	of	nationalist	subject	formation	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways.		The	marking	of	difference	in	practices	of	Islam	along	the	lines	of	religion	and	culture	draw	on	nationalist	xenophobic	discourses	that	construct	Hinduism	and	the	Hindu	as	the	foreign	other.		This	same	distinction	between	religion	and	culture	is	mobilized	to	demonize	
mullahs	as	extremist	others	and	their	followers	as	mindless	‘sheep’.		Dawah	taking	place	within	and	through	these	processes	of	othering,	then,	is	part	of	constructions	of	the	self	as	a	rational	and	modern	pious	subject.		Thus,	as	a	process	of	subject	formation	that	mobilizes	mind/body,	rational/irrational,	and	tradition/modernity	as	foundational	binaries,	my	respondents’	literalist	approach	to	piety	constructs	its	own	hierarchical	structures	that	bring	it	into	complicity	with	liberalism.		
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Conclusion			 By	way	of	conclusion,	I	recount	two	anecdotes	of	interactions	I	had	with	other	academics	in	relation	to	my	research.		I	received	an	email	from	a	filmmaker	who	wanted	to	produce	a	documentary	film	about	women	and	Islam	for	her	graduate	thesis.		She	told	me	that	she	was	interested	in	finding	out	more	about	women	“extremists”,	women	who	perhaps	would	be	part	of	or	in	support	of	Al-Qaeda	or	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	Levant	(ISIL).		She	thought	that	Al-Huda	women	would	fit	this	description.		I	asked	her	why	she	thought	she	would	find	“extremist”	women	at	Al-Huda.		She	retorted,	“how	are	they	not	extremists?	They	wear	the	niqab	don’t	they?”		When	describing	my	dissertation	research	to	other	academics	I	am	often	met	with	questions	and	comments	that	stem	from	Islamophobic	discourses	of	Muslim	women.		What	is	most	surprising	is	that	many	of	these	academics	are	respected	for	their	feminist	and	anti-racist	work	and,	indeed,	many	of	them	have	influenced	my	analytical	frameworks.		One	such	professor	in	Canada	responded	to	my	synopsis	of	my	dissertation	research	with	much	enthusiasm.		She	went	on	to	tell	me	about	a	talk	she	had	heard	about	women	who	wear	the	niqab	and	asked	me	to	guess	where	I	thought	most	women	who	wear	the	niqab	in	Canada	were	born.		She	then	exclaimed,	“can	you	believe	that	most	of	them	are	born	here	in	Canada?”		The	conversation	then	took	an	even	more	disturbing	turn	as	she	went	on	to	elaborate	on	how	she	never	knows	how	to	engage	with	students	in	her	courses	who	wear	the	niqab	and	that	after	having	attended	this	talk,	she	feels	more	comfortable	around	them.				 While	there	is	much	to	unpack	in	these	anecdotes,	I	recount	these	recent	encounters	to	highlight	the	academic	context	in	which	this	dissertation	was	produced,	where	popular	Islamophobic	discourses	persist	in	subtle	and	not	so	subtle	ways	and	continue	to	shape	
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how	Muslim	women	are	understood	not	only	in	knowledge	production	but	in	everyday	academic	interactions.		For	instance,	in	each	of	the	interactions	mentioned	above,	practices	of	veiling	and	especially	the	niqab	figure	as	the	pivotal	feature	for	defining	women	who	wear	the	niqab	and	for	determining	how	to	interact	with	them.		Moreover,	in	these	interactions,	the	niqab	figures	as	an	over	determined	symbol	that	conveys	a	whole	gamut	of	information	about	these	women	–	where	they	were	born,	their	politics,	their	social	skills.		That	Muslim	women’s	public	displays	of	piety	such	as	the	niqab	continue	to	be	perceived	as	evidence	of	irreconcilable	difference	demonstrates	the	persistence	of	Islamophobic	processes	of	othering	shaped	by	the	normative	secularity	of	academic	spaces.				The	persistence	of	these	reductive	and	essentialist	understandings	may	be	why	many	scholars	of	Islam	and	Muslim	women,	such	as	the	proponents	of	Islamic	feminism	discussed	in	chapter	three,	tend	to	frame	analyses	of	Muslim	women	through	secular	epistemological	frameworks	in	an	attempt	to	prove	that	these	women	and	their	practices	of	piety	can	be	reconciled	with	secular	modernity.		However,	this	tendency	often	results	in	explaining	away	practices	of	piety	by	reducing	them	to	social,	political,	or	economic	motivations.		For	instance,	veiling	is	often	explained	as	a	form	of	socio-economically	determined	patriarchal	oppression,	or	an	embodied	symbol	of	nationalist	identity,	or	a	form	of	resistance	to	Western	materialism.		At	times,	in	an	effort	to	combat	Islamophobic	discourses	about	Muslim	women,	these	characterizations	empty	these	practices	of	piety	of	the	sacred	in	order	to	redeem	them	as	intelligible	subjects	of	secular	modernity.		In	this	dissertation,	I	build	on	these	efforts	to	combat	Islamophobic	forms	of	knowledge	production	by	deepening	understandings	of	Muslim	women’s	processes	of	pious	subject	making.		I	do	this	by	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	and	by	taking	
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the	sacred	seriously	when	the	women	I	met	with	explained	how	they	practice	Islam	and	what	shapes	their	various	practices	of	piety.		By	taking	up	the	spiritual	as	epistemological,	this	analysis	contributes	to	unsettling	the	normativity	of	discursively	colonized	categories	of	analysis	that	reproduce	Islamophobic	analytical	frameworks	when	mobilized	in	relation	to	Muslim	women.		This	epistemological	framework	further	produces	an	analysis	of	women	engaged	in	developing	their	piety	that	does	not	confine	them	to	the	referent	of	the	gendered	Muslim	citizen-subject	or	the	Muslim	feminist	subject.		In	other	words,	in	this	dissertation,	their	relationships	with	Islam	are	not	just	understood	in	terms	defined	by	religio-nationalist	or	secular	feminist	projects	and	discourses.		Rather,	I	critically	analyze	my	respondents’	Islamic	subjectivities	as	entangled	with,	but	not	confined	by,	these	discourses.		This	not	only	permits	a	better	understanding	of	how	they	give	meaning	to	their	practices	of	piety,	but	it	also	enables	an	analysis	of	their	complicities	in	structures	of	power	and	discourses	of	exclusion.			Working	through	women’s	conceptualizations	of	qawwam,	which	is	often	taken	up	as	irrefutable	evidence	of	women’s	subjugation	in	Islam,	I	argued	against	a	reductive	understanding	of	women’s	belief	in	this	concept	as	indicative	of	submission	to	patriarchal	oppression.		Instead,	relying	on	how	the	women	I	interviewed	explained	how	they	understood	and	inhabit	qawwam,	I	maintained	that	it	is	best	understood	in	relation	to	the	
akhira	as	a	divine	system	of	rights	and	responsibilities	that	is	inhabited	and	negotiated	in	multiple	and	relational	ways.		The	example	of	how	women	conceptualize	qawwam	brings	into	focus	the	trappings	of	secular	epistemological	frameworks	that	would	fail	to	factor	in	the	sacred	dimensions	of	what	it	means	for	women	to	inhabit	the	qawwam	of	the	men	in	their	lives.		Accounting	for	the	sacred	dimension	of	qawwam,	as	per	how	several	women	I	
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met	understood	and	inhabited	it,	complicates	normative	readings	of	signs	of	patriarchy.		That	is,	for	example,	a	sexual	division	of	labour	or	adherence	to	strict	gender	roles	is	not	in	and	of	itself	evidence	of	patriarchal	oppression.		The	secularizing	impulse	in	knowledge	production	about	Muslim	women	extends	beyond	the	academy	and	can	be	seen	in	particularly	acute	ways	in	popular	representations	of	Muslim	women.		For	instance,	the	need	or	desire	to	normalize	Muslim	women	by	effacing	piety	is	evident	in	the	recent	surge	in	representations	of	fictional	Muslim	women	characters	in	popular	comic	books	and	animated	series	such	as	Ms.	Marvel,	Bloody	Nasreen,	and	Burka	Avenger.		The	central	character	and	hero	in	each	of	these	productions	is	a	Pakistani	Muslim	woman	who	fights	villains	using	her	superpowers,	street	smarts,	and/or	physical	prowess.		But,	as	in	the	case	of	Malala	Yousafzai,	they	are	represented	as	not	particularly	pious	or	their	piety	is	represented	as	parenthetical	to	their	heroism.		Although	these	representations	are	a	welcomed	counter	narrative	in	the	context	of	popular	cultures	that	seem	to	be	unable	or	unwilling	to	see	Muslim	women	as	anything	but	oppressed,	the	secularizing	impulse	remains.		That	is,	in	their	attempts	to	provide	an	alternative	image,	these	cultural	productions	represent	Muslim	women	as	empowered	because	of	their	secularity.		These	representations	reinforce	the	problematic	notion	that	Muslim	women’s	agency	can	only	be	recognized	or	achieved	through	secularism.	In	this	dissertation	I	also	argue	that	to	understand	the	spiritual	as	epistemological	not	only	produces	a	framework	that	elucidates	the	complexity	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivities,	but	it	is	also	integral	to	a	robust	understanding	of	complicities	in	relations	of	power	and	forms	of	othering.		Take,	for	example,	the	ways	in	which	the	women	I	interviewed	position	themselves	as	the	rational	subject	of	Islam.		This	aspect	of	their	self-
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presentation	has	been	an	effective	tool	for	dismantling	religio-nationalist	constructions	of	the	ideal	Muslim	woman	and	for	combating	the	Islamophobia	they	encounter.		However,	the	authorizing	discourse	of	rationality	also	furnishes	their	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	with	dynamics	of	power	that	manifest	in	dawah	activities	such	as	the	maasi	class.		Their	emphasis	on	the	skills	and	ability	to	read,	understand	and	apply	holy	texts	produces	a	hierarchal	notion	of	piety	that	marginalizes	or	excludes	the	illiterate	from	the	category	of	a	good	Muslim.		Dawah	taking	place	within	and	through	these	processes	of	pious	subject	formation	then	is	constitutive	of	and	constituted	by	processes	of	othering.			While	the	women	I	interviewed	focused	their	dawah	activities	on	Pakistani	Muslim	communities,	they	have	also	had	an	impact	beyond	these	communities	through,	for	example,	welfare	activities	targeted	at	Christian	and	Hindu	minorities	in	Pakistan,	outreach	in	the	Somali	community	in	Canada,	and	missionary	work	in	the	Caribbean.		These	dawah	activities	are	shaped	by	how	race	and	caste	shape	conceptualizations	of	the	Pakistani	Christian	and	Hindu	other,	and	Caribbean	and	black	Muslims.		Tracing	how	constructions	of	the	pious	self,	and	concomitant	processes	of	othering,	manifest	in	the	context	of	these	relationships	would	further	enhance	understandings	of	the	complicities	of	piety	in	articulations	of	difference	and	forms	of	exclusion	and	marginalization.		Analytical	openings	produced	through	de-centering	secular	epistemological	frameworks	enable	the	foregrounding	of	such	nuances	of	Muslim	women’s	subjectivity.			 	
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